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Abstract: 
Indicator-based methods that enable inexpensive evaluations of patent rights 
appear to have great potential as management tools. However, as of today these 
methods still require refinement to satisfy companies’ applied needs. This paper 
analyzes the validity of so-far untested indicators of patent value to enhance the 
quality of patent assessments using indicators. Following an overview of the state 
of the art, the article expands the theory by eliciting patent attorneys’ strategies to 
maximize profits from protecting intellectual property. Inspirations for the 
computation of new value indicators are gathered. Then, based on a newly 
compiled data set consisting of 813 EP patents, the probability of an opposition 
against a patent is modeled by established and new value indicators. The untested 
indicators draw from publicly available procedural information as well as full-text 
documents. The results show that accelerated examination requests and qualified 
word counts are correlated with the opposition decision and enhance the quality of 
existing valuation methods. 
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Introduction 
 
”Most investment banks have teams of accountants, tax advisers, management 
consultants, and regulatory affair experts to structure their deals to a company’s 
greatest advantage. But one would be hard -pressed to find a major investment 
bank that employs even one individual with experience in evaluating patent 
portfolios. [...] as matters stand now, ‘due diligence’ regarding patent assets is 
usually more myth than reality.” (Rivette and Kline, 2000) 
 
This critique by Harvard Business Review authors Rivette and Kline is harsh. Existing services 
offered by investment banking houses to value intellectual property (IP) are given little credit; 
serious doubts are especially uttered concerning the practitioners’ expertise and competence in 
evaluating patent portfolios. At the same time, the authors foresee a rising importance of IP assets 
in corporate business strategy. 
 From my knowledge of the field I agree with the authors’ remarks. Looking at the 
scientific literature, however, I find it hard to put the blame on the practitioners. As a matter of 
fact, despite the diversity of articles from Industrial Organization (IO) or legal scholars on value 
related issues of intellectual property rights, there is a lack of scientific papers that restructure the 
knowledge on the evaluation of patent rights from a corporation’s perspective. Building on earlier 
works by Pakes (1986) and Harhoff et al. (Harhoff D, Scherer F, Vopel K. 1999. Citations, 
Familiy Size, Opposition and the Value of Patent Rights. Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität 
München, Harvard University, ZEW Mannheim, Munich/Boston/Mannheim), Reitzig (2002) lays 
out that there exist several approaches which can be pursued by companies to value their 
intellectual assets. As it turns out, valuation approaches using patent indicators seem especially 
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convenient for the assessment of patent portfolios comprising a large number of intellectual 
property rights. Here, indicators drawing from publicly available patent data banks are computed 
for individual patents and are fed into a valuation algorithm that yields the patent portfolio value 
as the cumulative value of the individual patents. Those patent indicators can usually be 
computed at little cost per patent. However, both from a theoretical and applied standpoint the 
indicators need to be valid correlates of patent value. Furthermore, the indicators used should be 
available early in a patent’s life to allow for evaluations of young patents that may be particularly 
interesting for the company’s future performance.2 As the prediction quality of the portfolio’s 
value normally increases with the number of valid patent correlates used in the estimation (if they 
are not collinear), there exists a vital interest in validating as many indicators as possible. 
The scientific challenge at this point therefore lies with the validation of further patent indicators 
that draw from publicly available information and are available early in the lifetime of the patent. 
The task is especially aggravated by the complex interdependencies between a patent’s economic 
value, the latent determinants of this value, and observable information resulting finally from 
legal actions that can be used to compute indicators. 
This paper addresses this problem in two steps. First, I provide a theoretical framework by laying 
out the state of the art and then expanding the existing theory of measuring patent value with 
indicators. Then, empirical results from a large scale study in the chemical industry are presented. 
In more detail, the remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Part two of the paper addresses 
theoretical issues. The third section of the paper describes the research design. Here hypotheses 
concerning the correlation between a patent’s economic value and the indicators are derived. Part 
four of the paper presents empirical results. The paper concludes with a summary providing an 
outlook on future research. 
                                                           
2 Note that from an ex-ante  point of view (filing date of the patent) explanatory variables are already valid patent 
value indicators if they are correlated with the anticipated value of the patent. This paper considers indicators as 
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Theoretical Framework 
 
 The following section is split in three paragraphs. First, it is worth reviewing briefly a 
definition of patent value that is suited for companies which find themselves in a competitive 
environment. Secondly, an overview of the state of the art on value indicators of patents is 
presented before I finally move on to a third subsection in which I try to open up the ‘black-box’ 
of patent attorneys’ work. These last results are based on interviews with nine senior patent 
experts from several law firms and the European Patent Office (EPO). The description of the 
patent attorneys’ strategies to maximize profits from protecting IP inspire the computation of new 
value indicators that use observable information of two kinds: Procedural information and full-
text information from patent drafts. The latter type of information in particular has rarely been 
used to compile indicators of patent value to date.  
  
A definition of patent value 
The value of individual intellectual assets is rarely observable. This may be due to the fact that 
almost no marketplace exists where single patents are dealt. The great idiosyncracy of a patent’s 
value for different potential owners associated with information asymmetries between potential 
sellers and buyers, and the dependence of a single patent on its surrounding portfolio of IP assets 
may be seen as the reasons for this phenomenon. 
Thus, to determine the value of an individual patent, inductive approaches must be chosen and a 
definition for the latent construct ‘patent value’ is needed. Harhoff et al. (1999) show in a 
formalized fashion that for a corporation involved in technological competition, the value of a 
patent is best defined as its asset value. This definition covers the majority of the empirically 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
‘valid’ if they either correlate with the patent’s value from an ex-post  or from an ex-ante perspective. 
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relevant scenarios. To determine a patent’s value, it is therefore necessary to consider its 
(observable) effects on prices, costs, and sold quantities of patent-protected products by the 
owner and its simultaneous (unobservable or counterfactual) effects on the proprietor’s 
competitors. As Reitzig (Reitzig M. 2001b. Evaluating Patent Portfolios - Using Indicators for 
Technology Management Purposes. Ludwig-Maximilians -University Munich: Munich Germany.) 
shows in a survey of the theoretical literature, counterfactual effects should become assessable 
when quantifying the following patent’s latent value determinants: state of the art (of existing 
technology), novelty, inventive activity, breadth, difficulty to invent around, disclosure, and 
dependence on complementary assets. Thus, when speaking of indicators of patent value, they 
can be theoretically valid correlates of a patent’s value in two fundamentally different cases. 
Either they show a direct correlation with observable prices, costs, or sold quantities of the patent 
protected product, or they operationalize latent determinants of patent value such as novelty, 
inventive activity, breadth, difficulty to invent around, disclosure, and dependence on 
complementary assets.  Figure 1 illustrates the interdependencies between patent indicators 
(examples are forward citations, backward citations, and family size), observable economic 
quantities, and latent determinants of patent value. 
 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
 
As of today, however, little empirical evidence exists on the complex interaction between 
indicators, determinants, and prices, costs, and quantities of protected products sold. Moreover, 
even from a theoretical point, the complex information hidden in the patent data is still a ‘black 
box’ to many economists. In the context of this paper, it seems particularly puzzling that 
indicators can refer to different determinants of patent value at the same time. Claims, for 
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example, have been related to the breadth of a patent. At the same time, they also reveal 
information about its inventive activity (non-obviousness) . As breadth and inventive activity may 
affect the economic value in different ways, however, these ambiguities pose problems on the 
interpretation of the coefficient of the claims indicator on value. The same problem holds true for 
several other indicators, especially for those indicators that use highly patent specific-
information. This paper therefore tries to contribute to a better understanding of interactions and 
interdependencies between patent value, value determinants, and indicators by analyzing patent 
attorneys’ decisions during the patent application procedure. By doing so, the paper also inspires 
the compilation of value indicators using so-far unused patent information. Before this analysis is 
undertaken, however, the existing state of the art on the assessment of patents using indicators is 
briefly summarized in the next section. 
 
Known indicators of patent value – an overview 
Until today, a variety of variables have been tested as indicators of patent value in 
empirical surveys. Looking at 23 empirical studies related to patent indicators and value, Reitzig 
(2001b) analyzes the appropriateness of the 13 best-known indicator variables for business 
purposes. In the following, only the results are presented (for a detailed description, see Reitzig 
(2002), chapter 4). Table 1 summarizes known patent indicators and their advantages and 
limitations for business purposes. The three columns in Table 1 each refer to one of the 
evaluation criteria for patent indicators laid out in the introduction to this paper. Column A 
reports on the validity of the indicator variable. Column B shows the point in time at which the 
information to compute the indicator becomes accessible. Time is measured in months starting 
from the filing date of the patent.3 Finally column C reveals whether the information is available 
                                                           
3 Note that the information on time is only valid for DE or EP patents. 
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electronically or has to be collected manually. All indicators draw from publicly available 
information. 
Insert Table 1 about here 
 
Column A itself is subdivided into two subcolumns that regard the theoretical plausibility and the 
existing empirical evidence for the validity of the indicator in separate ways. It turns out that 
forward citations, family size, and the ownership variable show the highest degree of theoretical 
and empirical validation. However market value also seems to be a good indicator for a 
company’s intellectual property assets.4 Forward citations had been introduced by Trajtenberg 
(1990) and had been validated as indicators of patent value in numerous subsequent surveys, e.g. 
by Albert et al. (1991), Harhoff et al. (1999), Lanjouw and Schankerman (2000), and Harhoff and 
Reitzig (2000). The rationale standing behind the use of this information as a measure for patent 
value is that the economic importance of a certain patent should be correlated with the frequency 
at which it gets cited as relevant state of the art for further developments.  Family size was 
introduced as an indicator by Putnam (1996) and again re-validated by Lanjouw and 
Schankerman (2000), Harhoff and Reitzig (2000), and Guellec and van Pottelsberghe de la 
Potterie (2000).5 The idea standing behind the use of this measure is that patent owners signal 
their willingness to incur increased costs for international patent protection which is associated 
with increased returns from patent protection, too. On the one hand, the patent owners are 
apparently willing to incur additional fixed application costs. On the other hand, they signal that 
they are willing to run an increased risk of costly legal arguments. The correlation between 
                                                           
4 Note that the ‘market value’ indicator differs from the other indicators in three respects. First, the market value of a 
company only allows to serve as an indicator of the aggregate value of intellectual property assets of the company. 
Besides, almost all empirical studies on the correlation between market value and the number of patents report on a 
lag structure which has to be taken into account. Finally, ‘market value’ is information that does not draw from 
publicly available patent databanks. 
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market value and patents had been examined by Griliches (1981), Conolly et al. (1986), Conolly 
and Hirschey (1988), Cockburn and Griliches (1988), Megna and Klock (1993), and Hall et al. 
(2000). All the studies mentioned above differ with respect to the quality of the research design, 
the sample sizes, and the kinds of patents (US, EP, DE). They do, however, have a common 
feature in that they all validate indicators which are linked to patent value by rationales that speak 
to rather general economic considerations which do not particularly involve in-depth knowledge 
of institutional details of the patent system. The concept of using citation measures was well 
known from other disciplines of social science. The fact that ownership affects value is a classical 
IO consideration. Thus, these indicators may be seen as ‘first generation’ indicators of patent 
value. By saying so, no depreciation whatsoever is expressed. On the contrary, the indicators 
seem reliable and helpful for the evaluation of patents. 
In more recent times, other observable information from patent databanks was taken to compile 
further proxy variables of patent value. In his study, Lerner (1994) successfully linked the market 
value of 535 biotech companies to the number of patents and the average number of 4 digit 
International Patent Classifications (IPC) of the company’s patents. His goal was to 
operationalize the ‘breadth’ or the ‘scope’ of a patent. Unfortunately, the ‘scope’ variable turns 
out to be an insignificant regressor in most of the subsequent surveys. Guellec and van 
Pottelsberghe de la Potterie (2000) and Harhoff and Reitzig (2000) computed further indicators 
speaking to patent-specific economic considerations, such as referring to the filing strategy or the 
legal contents of backward citations (i.e., how many patents in the relevant technical field did 
already exist before and how similar are they to the patent that is to be evaluated). Obviously, as 
of today there exists less empirical evidence for these ‘second generation’ indicators that use 
patent-specific procedural information and link it to patent value or patent value correlates. Still, 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
5 See Guellec, D. and B. van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie (2000). Analysing Patent Grants. Free University: Brussels 
Belgium. 
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the indicators are appealing as they take on the patent-specific knowledge and use it for the 
computation of value proxies. 
Up until now, however, very few researchers have exploited the last resource of information 
available on patents (i.e. the patent full-text documents themselves). Both, ‘first and second 
generation’ indicators make use of ‘first page’ information stored in databanks. To patent 
attorneys, this seems strange to some extent, since most of the information on a protected 
technology and its anticipated economic value is conveyed in the patent draft itself. But then 
again, special knowledge is required to decipher the relevant information which is codified in the 
patent document in a very special kind of way. Tong and Frame (1992) were the first to use 
information from patent documents and make an attempt to compute what I will call the ‘third 
generation’ indicators. They correlated the number of claims in a patent draft to several 
macroeconomic indices of a nation’s technological performance. Most recently, Lanjouw and 
Schankerman (2000) utilize the information on claims to model the probability of challenge and 
validity suits for a sample of US patents. The number of claims has been regarded as a possible 
operationalization of a patent’s ‘breadth’. Third generation indicators (i.e. any indicators 
compiled from the patent full-text itself) seem to have one major advantage and one major 
disadvantage over other indicators. They are attractive since they are available early in time 
(directly after the publication of the patent) and since they show a strong theoretical foundation. 
Their disadvantage lies in their endogeneity, meaning that the patent document is drafted by the 
proprietor (or his attorney) who therefore has the opportunity to infer on the value of his patent by 
the mode of drafting the document. 
Still, when thinking of ways to develop new value indicators, the greatest potential lies with 
second and third generation variables. The challenge here is to understand the codification of 
technology and value-related information by patent attorneys in such detail that compilations of 
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new indicators show a maximum of theoretical foundation, and a minimum of ambiguity and 
endogeneity. The following section therefore sketches the strategic considerations followed by 
patent attorneys during the filing process and opens up the black box of their codification. 
 
Expanding the theory – opening the “black box” of patent attorneys’ work6 
To gain an understanding of the meaning and interdependencies of observable patent 
information and link it to patent value, interviews were conducted with nine senior experts from 
patent law firms, a corporation’s patent department, and the European Patent Office (EPO). As it 
turned out, the core of the patent attorneys’ work is to maximize profits from legal protection for 
a given invention. Economically speaking, the patent attorneys’ work comes closest to a decision-
making problem under uncertainty. I will therefore first outline the decision problem in an 
abstract way. Then I show how exogenous and endogenous variables (from the standpoint of the 
patent attorney) enter the attorney’s rationale. I will focus mainly on the state of the art, the 
inventive activity, and the breadth of the patent. Since those decision variables are latent 
variables, I will finally outline how the attorney’s rationale translates into observable action. 
Here, I will focus on the draft of the patent application and briefly mention two procedural steps 
that have not yet been described in the literature. 
The following descriptions of the decision-making problem the attorney faces refer to the 
European patent system. Thus, some procedural details cannot be directly transferred to the US 
system. The basic material trade-offs, however, also hold true for US patents. 
Patent protection in Europe can be achieved in three ways. Either the applicant chooses 
separate national filings in the countries in which he/she seeks protection or he/she decides to file 
a central European application  according to the European Patent Convention (EPC) leading to a 
                                                           
6 An extended version of this paragraph appeared as a separate German publication by Harhoff and Reitzig (2001). 
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European (EP) patent. A third possibility is to use a global priority (PCT) application and 
subsequently decide for one of the two ways described above. The modes differ with respect to 
fixed and variable costs. As a rule of thumb it may be stated that the fixed costs of filing increase 
going from the national, via the European to the global application mode. At the same time, 
variable costs for additional designated states of protection decrease in the same order. As the 
data set in this paper is based on patents filed exclusively via the EPC or PCT, the description of 
the decision-making process is limited to EP patents only. The ‘life’ of a patent in Europe may 
take several paths. After its grant it can be centrally legally attacked in a so-called opposition 
procedure within nine months. Third parties gain the chance to diminish or completely destroy 
the patent’s validity for its entire territory of legal effect. The territory of legal effect is chosen by 
the patent holder. He designates the countries for which he seeks protection and incurs variable 
costs for each country. The EPO decides on the opposition filed and either upholds, amends, or 
revokes the patent. Appeals against decisions on the opposition plea by the EPO can be filed from 
either side, the patent holder and the opposing party. Figure 2 shows the legal ‘life-tree’ of an EP 
patent. 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
 
Using the tree in Figure 2, the patent attorneys’ work can now be described in an abstract way. 
(Anticipated) Profits can be assigned to all the outcomes of the tree. Probabilities can be assigned 
to the occurrence of the different legal scenarios (not illustrated in Figure 2). The patent’s value is 
then the sum over the expected profits (i.e. profits times probability of scenario) in all possible 
scenarios. It is the job of the attorneys (in cooperation with technology managers) to influence 
profits in discrete scenarios and probabilities of different scenarios becoming true in such a way 
that the overall expected profits are maximized. 
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According to the experts, the state of the art, the inventive activity, and the market size 
underlying the protected invention are the most important exogenous parameters in the 
maximization process. Besides, the industry often dictates whether the patent can be used as an 
exclusion right in the traditional sense or whether it may rather serve as a bargaining chip in 
technology negotiations with other companies (see Rahn, 1994, and Hall and Ham, 2001). The 
most important set-screws to be influenced by the patent attorney on the other hand are breadth, 
disclosure, and the mode of filing. What makes the maximization process complex is that the 
endogenous variables influence the patent’s overall expected value in opposite ways through the 
probabilities and the static profits. In fact, trading off between the different effects of the 
endogenous variables is therefore a crucial part of the attorneys’ work as will become clear from 
the following. 
At the first meeting between patent attorney and inventor, the expected net profits from 
protecting the invention are assessed, basing the estimation on the exogenous parameters 
mentioned above. The estimations are very qualitative, but this is how the attorneys value the 
exogenous variables: 
· Little state of the art hints at maximum at a ‘latent’ market where benefits from patenting can 
be expected in the future. 
· Comprehensive state of the art points at an active market and patenting seems profitable. 
However, an increasing state of the art raises the risk of legal conflict with competitors and 
therefore decreases the expected profits.  
· If inventive activity is small and there is little state of the art, expected profits are small. 
· If inventive activity is small and there is comprehensive state of the art, possible profits are 
high. However, the risk of losing the patent in a legal argument raises, too, decreasing the 
overall expected profits from patenting. Expected profits may range from medium to high. 
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· If inventive activity is high and there is comprehensive state of the art, possible profits seem 
high, and there is little risk of losing the patent in a legal argument. Expected profits are very 
high. 
Given the exogenous variables, the patent attorney can maximize profits by adjusting the 
endogenous variables with respect to the situation he/she is facing. He/she will extend the breadth  
to its maximum for patents showing a high inventive activity and possibly high profits. By doing 
so he/she maximizes the profits for each scenario in Figure 2. He/she may well increase the 
probability of a legal attack at the same time, but the probability of losing in the opposition case 
is small. The fixed costs for the opposition are outweighed by the increase in the profits. 
Conversely, the attorney will reduce the breadth for patents with a decreasing inventive activity. 
The higher the possible profits from a valid patent the more he/she will reduce the breadth given 
the same inventive activity since he/she does not want to lose the patent in a legal dispute. The 
considerations are similar though slightly different for bargaining chip patents. Here, legal 
disputes are the exception and the attorneys will only make sure that the application ‘survives’ the 
granting procedure. 
Until this point, consideration was only given to latent variables that drive the rationale of 
patent attorneys. The attorneys’ considerations, however, manifest themselves in the patent draft. 
Thus by looking at the patent draft, it should be possible to gain hints at the anticipated value of 
the patent by the attorneys. The interviews reveal that this task may in practice be aggravated by 
the fact that different patent attorneys have individual modes of drafting and that considerable 
noise should be expected when pursuing a patent text analysis. Still, in principle the following 
passages in the patent draft should reveal the information of interest: 
· The state of the art is described in the first section of the patent.  
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· The degree of inventive activity is reflected in the description of the technical problem. The 
technical problem is normally presented following the description of the state of the art. Its 
solution is presented in the disclosure of the patent, and summarized in the 
· Claims’ section at the end of the patent. Claims also refer to the inventive activity behind the 
patent. At the same time, the breadth of the patent should be reflected in the claims. In the 
chemical industry, especially the number of independent product claims should be an 
indicator of patent breadth. 
· Dependent product claims, process- and application claims also add to the breadth of the 
patent. At the same time they operationalize what patent attorneys call fall-back options for 
legal disputes. Their number should rise with an increasing risk of legal attack (falling 
inventive activity, increasing profits in scenarios). 
· Finally, technical advantages and preferred technical solutions in the disclosure should also 
serve as hidden fall-back options. On the other hand, they often demonstrate that inventor and 
attorney already have an application of the invention on their mind, pointing at an existing 
market. 
Figure 3 illustrates the decision making during the filing process and links it to the observable 
information described above. 
 
Insert Figure 3 about here 
 
As mentioned above, the decision-making process of the attorneys takes place under uncertainty. 
Thus, before drafting the patent application, attorneys will try to gather as much information 
about the underlying state of the art and the market size as they can. The information will ceteris 
paribus enhance their ability to assess the patent’s novelty and inventive activity and hence its  
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economic value. A way to gather information more quickly than usual is to request an accelerated 
search report on the state of the art from the EPO. A way to “buy” decision time is to file the 
patent through the PCT.7 Once attorneys decide that protection is valuable and should be acquired 
as soon as possible, they can accelerate the granting procedure in the European system by 
requesting an accelerated examination. On the global level, they can accelerate protection by 
applying through the so-called chapter II of the PCT. 8 
 
The Empirical Research Design 
 
 To validate new indicators of patent value, this paper attempts to link patent value to 
observable procedural information and to the design of certain text passages in the patent draft in 
a large-scale empirical study. As valuations of patents are very hard to get, a patent value 
correlate is chosen as the dependent variable in the regressions, namely the likelihood of an 
opposition against the patent. In the following I will briefly sketch why the approach seems 
plausible in general but I will also point at the interpretation problems of the regression results 
that occur from the chosen design. 
 
Opposition and patent value 
Extending the model by Lanjouw and Lerner (1997), Harhoff and Reitzig (2000) can 
show that the condition for the occurrence of an opposition is given by formula 1 (see Harhoff 
and Reitzig (2000) for the complete derivation. In the following only the main findings are 
recalled): 
 
                                                           
7 Further details follow in the interpretation of the multivariate statistical results. 
8 See footnote no. 6. 
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In formula 1, aj  corresponds to the value of the valid patent for its owner and j  is the benefits 
of a successful opposition for the opponent. W is the anticipated probability by the opponent of 
winning the opposition, w is the patent holder’s anticipated probability of losing the patent. L and 
l refer to the litigation costs for both parties, and S are the settlement costs. Formula 1 illustrates 
that the probability of an opposition is correlated with the value of the valid patent for the patent 
owner, aj . This observation supports the research design chosen in this study. At the same time, 
however, formula 1 also shows that the likelihood of an opposition depends on probabilities of 
the opposition outcome  as anticipated by the opposing parties. In fact, if settlement costs exceed 
litigation costs by large, the settlement option becomes negligible and the likelihood of an 
opposition is described by formula 2.  
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Thus, when interpreting regression results of the likelihood of an opposition on indicators, two 
things should be kept in mind. At first, the likelihood of an opposition is driven by the profits j of 
the opponent in the case of a successful opposition. Those should be highly correlated though not 
necessarily identical to the value of the valid patent for the owner, aj . In a simple one-product 
world where the patent protects a single product and there are only two players, j would be the 
duopoly profits of the opponent whereas aj  would be the monopoly profits of the patent owner. 
To faciliate the following descriptions, I will refer to the opponent’s benefits from a successful 
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opposition as the patent’s value. Assuming that j and aj  are similar, the patent’s absolute value 
will be similar for both, the patent owner and the opponent. Secondly, proxy variables may well 
refer to both the value of a successful opposition for the opponent as such, and the anticipated 
probability of the outcome of the opposition procedure.  
 
Data collection and computation of indicators 
The only available source of patent full-texts in machine-readable format for the time 
being is the EUROPATFULL© databank maintained by the Fachinformationszentrum 
Karlsruhe/Germany. At the day of the data collection, the full-text patent data were only available 
for EP patents granted between 1992 and 2000. Given the average time of around 4.3 years for 
granting a patent at the EPO, I chose patent filings for the years 1992 - 1994 for the study. I 
decided to focus on patent filings from the chemical industry so that the patent rights would be 
exclusion rights rather than bargaining chips (see e.g. Cohen et al., 2000). The sampling was 
based on a four digit IPC classification for industries as proposed by Schmoch and Kirsch 
(1994)9. The patents come from six different chemical branches: organic fine chemicals (37%), 
polymer chemistry (38%), pharmaceuticals (5%), biotechnology (3%), agricultural chemistry 
(1%), and petroleum chemistry (16%). As the computation of indicators referring to the wording 
of the patent draft should originally be carried out using a text scanning software for German 
language, I also decided to look only at patents who would have a German, Swiss, or Austrian 
inventor.10 Out of a sample of 2570 remaining patents I chose 1000 patents almost randomly, the 
only alteration being to ensure that the opposition rate would be on the same order of magnitude 
                                                           
9 Appendix A shows the definition of industrial sectors using four digit IPC classes as proposed by Schmoch and 
Kirsch (1994). 
10 The software searches for German keywords in the patent draft and can therefore only be applied to German 
documents for the time being. First results showed, however, that for the time being the software still yields 
significantly different results from a manual compilation which is why the indicators were computed manually for 
this study once more. 
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as the long-term average rate of 8.1% for all EP patents. Finally, out of the 1000 documents 813 
appeared to be non-truncated and complete with respect to all different sections in the draft and 
were used for the analysis.  
 Using three further databanks11, indicators drawing from procedural patent information 
were computed. Among the indicators listed in Table 2 are 10 indicators (the first 10 in the table) 
that have been used in earlier studies. The last two indicators refer to the patentee’s options to 
accelerate the production of the search report by the EPO or to accelerate the granting procedure 
at the EPO which have not been tested before. Table 2 lists the variables in the first column, 
reports on their computation algorithm in the second column, and states the data source in column 
four. 
Insert Table 2 about here 
 
Contrasting Tables 1 and 2, it is conspicuous that forward citations are not computed in this 
study. The rationale behind this is very straight forward. The obvious disadvantage of forward 
citations as value indicators is their late availability in time. The goal of the paper, however, is to 
present indicators that serve as proxy variables for patent value at an early stage of the patents’ 
life. 
Aside from the indicators utilizing procedural patent information, I computed variables that 
directly draw from the full-text of the patent draft. The indicators are described in Table 3. The 
first column of Table 3 names the indicator, the second one briefly recalls the link between the 
indicator and the economic value of a patent.  
 
                                                           
11 The following three data banks were used in addition to EUROPATFULL ©: REFI, ELPAC, and EPASYS. The 
first two are all commercially available. Access to the last one was provided by the European Patent Office in 
Munich/Germany. 
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Insert Table 3 about here 
 
Derivation of hypotheses 
Column three of Table 2 and column five of Table 3 show the expected signs of the 
variable coefficients when tested as correlates of the likelihood of an opposition. Whereas 
correlations between procedural indicators and the likelihood of an opposition should be 
primarily mediated via the patent’s value, there seems to be a more complex relation between the 
text indicators and the likelihood of the opposition. Columns three and four in Table 4 therefore 
distinguish between the expected sign of the correlation between the profits from the protected 
invention and the text indicators, and the anticipated probability of the opponent to win in an 
opposition and the text indicators respectively. Column five of Table 3 then provides a very 
preliminary expectation of the aggregate effect that text indicators should have on the likelihood 
of an opposition. 
Due to possibly counteracting effects associated with the text indicators and resulting 
ambiguities concerning specific expectations in the empirical study, I chose to test three 
hypotheses of reduced information contents in this paper. The hypotheses tested in this paper are 
the following: 
 
· H1: There is a correlation between procedural indicators and the likelihood of an opposition. 
· H2: There is a correlation between text indicators and the likelihood of an opposition. 
· H3: There is a correlation between a set of procedural and text indicators and the likelihood of 
an opposition that is stronger than the correlations described in H1 and H2. 
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Empirical Results and Discussion 
 
 In the following, the empirical results are presented and discussed. The section on 
descriptive statistics will present the data and briefly report on the differences in the means for 
several explanatory variables in the group of the opposed patents and the remaining group. This 
leads to the description of the multivariate analysis in which I regress the likelihood of an 
opposition on the indicators. Following the hypotheses presented above, I will present separate 
regressions, based on indicators using procedural information, text indicators, and a combination 
of both separately. The aim is to discover whether the new text indicators are substitutes or 
complements to the established and new indicators drawing from procedural data. 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Table 4 summarizes the data as they were used in the study. The upper part of the table 
refers to procedural explanatory variables, the lower part shows the means for the text indicators.  
Insert Table 4 about here 
 
As can be seen from Table 4, about 13% of the patents in the sample were opposed. Thus, the 
opposition rate in the sample is slightly higher than the long-term average of 8.1% for the 
industry. Patents in the sample might therefore be a little more valuable than on average for this 
industry. Moving on to the other procedural information, some peculiarities can be observed. 
Whereas the number of  inventors and applicants seem very plausible comparing them to earlier 
studies, the PCT application ratios appear to be quite low. In fact, further cross checks of the data 
with the official bulletin issued by the EPO (EPO, 1998) confirm that the low percentage can be 
attributed to the selection criteria of the sample. With respect to the requests for accelerated 
  20
search or examination, the means in the sample again correspond to the long-term average value 
for EP patents across industries and seem therefore plausible. Going further down in Table 4, 
some observations seem noteworthy when looking at the text indicator variables. At first, all of 
the explanatory variables show remarkable variation which is intuitively positive. With respect to 
the number of independent claims, the mean value of 0.64 deserves some explanation. In order to 
distinguish between independent product claims and other independent claims (process or 
application claims), I counted product claims separately. Thus, the number of independent claims 
only refers to product claims, so does the number of dependent claims. Process and application 
claims were counted separately, but here no distinction between dependent and independent 
claims was made. 
 Having checked on the plausibility of the data and their appropriateness for the study, a 
more focused look on the variables’ means with respect to the underlying research question is 
taken in Table 5. Table 5 shows the means for the explanatory variables computed separately 
within two different categories, namely patents that received an opposition, and other patents. 
 
Insert Table 5 about here 
 
Table 5 shows that for five of the explanatory variables significant differences in the variables’ 
means exist in the two chosen categories, namely the family size, the number of inventors, the 
PCT II indicator, the indicator for an accelerated examination request, and the share of A-
documents among the patent backward citations. 
The difference in the means for the family size shows the expected sign. Increasing variable costs 
for additional designation states should correspond to a higher (anticipated) value of the patent 
and hence the opposition rate should rise. Coming to the number of inventors, one would argue 
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that the technical complexity of an invention is likely to increase with the number of people 
involved in its discovery. Looking at the differences in the PCT II means, theoretical expectations 
are confirmed by the data. A straight-forward explanation is the following: Higher fixed costs for 
patent protection should be correlated with higher anticipated revenues. The opposition rate 
should therefore be higher for patents filed through PCT II. In fact, the following section on the 
multivariate analysis will present more subtle explanation patterns that are especially needed 
when discussing the insignificance of the PCT I indicator. Again, a simple explanation for the 
increased mean of accelerated examination requests in the opposition category speaks to the cost 
commitments made by the patentee. The patentee incurs the risk of sunk costs when filing the 
accelerated examination request as he pays all fees at a point where the grant of the patent is not 
yet guaranteed. Speaking with Harhoff and Reitzig (2000) I would also have expected the share 
of A-documents among the backward citations to be lower in the opposition category. A higher 
share of A documents hints at ‘non-dangerous’ state of the art (i.e. state of the art which does not 
threaten the patent’s legal validity). 
Coming finally to the text indicators, again only some preliminary considerations shall be 
mentioned that are extended on shortly. Two fundamental explanations can be applied to the 
results of Table 6. Either the word counts do not serve as proper operationalizations of the latent 
value determinants of a patent and do neither refer to the anticipated value of the patent 
otherwise, or the correlations between the text indicators and the likelihood of an opposition are 
distracted by other effects in the data. Here again two explanation patterns seem most plausible. 
Either differences across the various chemical branches in the sample overlie the correlation 
proposed in H2, or individual modes of drafting patent documents by different patent attorneys 
lead to a systematic perturbation in the data. In the multivariate analysis, I try to ‘filter out’ both 
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possible effects. I control for the chemical branches and correct for heteroscedasticity in the data 
that may occur from the individual filing modes of the different patent attorneys. 
 
Multivariate Analysis 
 Seven different regressions of the likelihood of an opposition on value indicators are 
shown in this section. Table 6 presents three estimations of the likelihood of an opposition using 
a simple probit model based on indicators that draw from procedural patent information. Besides, 
dummy variables for the separate chemical branches enter to ensure that industry effects are not 
attributed to explanatory power of the indicators. 
 
Insert Table 6 about here 
 
Specification 6A is significant at the 0.1% level. Besides, five variables are individually 
significant, namely the family size, the number of inventors, the PCT II indicator, the indicator 
for an accelerated examination request, backward citations to the patent literature, and the dummy 
variable for organic fine chemistry. Thus, most of the bivariate results presented in Table 5 are 
reconfirmed in a multivariate context controlling for differences in the chemical branches. The 
insignificant coefficients in Table 6 shall be given only little consideration. As laid out in the 
survey of known indicators, I doubt that the ‘scope’ variable is a valid measure of the patent’s 
breadth and thus the result is not too surprising. The number of applicants might be insignificant 
due to the sample composition. As a matter of fact, multiple ownership was observed in only 15 
out of 813 cases. On the other hand it is rather surprising that A- and X-citation classifications 
turn out to be insignificant in this study. Turning to the PCT indicators, it seems interesting that a 
filing according to chapter II of the PCT is highly correlated with the likelihood of an opposition 
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whereas the PCT I indicator is insignificant. Therefore, a simple rationale relating the PCT 
indicators to patent value speaking only to increased fixed costs seems unconvincing. In deed, the 
argument explaining the empirical results is a little more complicated. Applicants filing patents 
through the PCT may choose the option for two different reasons that are properly to each other. 
Either they are very uncertain about the economic success of the patent’s underlying invention 
and they choose the option to “buy” additional decision time as will be described in the sentence 
after the next one, or, on the contrary, the economic success of the patent’s underlying invention 
is free of doubt already at the date of filing and the option is used to seek global protection as fast 
as possible. The fact the PCT can be used in these two opposite ways can only be explained when 
looking at the institutional details of patent law. PCT filings include a search of the state of the 
art by so-called International Search Authorities. The search report is produced within 18 months 
after the day of filing and then published. 19 months after filing the PCT application the patentee 
may either decide to drop his application if he/she thinks it is not profitable to seek protection. 
Alternatively, he/she may initiate the actual examination process and take a costly decision to 
pursue the filing until the end. He/she may finally also vote for a procedural way that is offered 
by chapter II of the PCT. This last procedural way offers the applicant an opportunity to request a 
so-called preliminary international examination and gives him/her another 11 months until he/she 
finally has to decide whether he/she enters the costly application process until the end. Thus, the 
PCT II option allows the patentee to buy another 11 months of decision time for a fixed sum 
which is small compared to the actual filing and translation costs that occur during the actual 
examination procedure. It is for the same reason that both PCT indicators can be considered as 
indicators for uncertainty on the side of the patentee which I attribute to a substantial anticipated 
risk of economic failure of the patent. At the same time, the PCT II indicator may hint at the 
complete opposite case indicating that the patentee expects significant profits from protecting his 
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invention. This is due to the following reason: The international preliminary examination carried 
out during the second phase of the PCT (months 19-30 after the filing date) is of real value to the 
patentee if he/she actually seeks international protection and does not only follow the PCT II to 
gain more time for his/her decisions. If the applicant is convinced about the economic value of 
his/her patent from the first day and if he/she wants to protect her invention internationally, 
he/she will choose the PCT II option and use the preliminary international examination report in 
the later granting procedure with the EPO or national patent offices. The international preliminary 
examination report is acknowledged as a substitute for regional or national examination reports 
by the EPO and several national patent offices, thus the patentee saves time and money by 
following PCT II in the end if he/she really seeks international protection. Coming back to this 
study, the empirical findings can now be explained quite well. In this sample of granted patents, 
PCT II cases should predominantly be cases in which the patentees sought to gain global 
protection as soon as possible. Thus, the PCT II indicator truly correlates with patent value. The 
same rationale, however, does not hold true for the PCT I indicator for the reasons given above. 
In this sample it is presumably instead an indicator of uncertainty at the beginning of the filing 
process and no significant correlation with patent value can be expected. The results confirm in 
part the findings by Guellec and van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie (2000), who also find that PCT 
II should indicate a higher value of a patent application than PCT I. However, the authors give no 
complete explanation for the phenomenon they observe. 
Finally, the differences in the levels of significance for the two acceleration requests can be 
explained very quickly. While the accelerated search request does not involve any costly decision 
or commitment by the applicant, the accelerated examination request involves some commitment 
by the patentee as mentioned above (bivariate analysis). It is therefore not surprising that the last 
indicator is significantly correlated with the likelihood of an opposition whereas the first one 
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turns out to be insignificant. Column B of Table 6 shows a specification in which the individually 
and jointly insignificant coefficients of specification 6A were dropped. By showing the marginal 
effects of specification 6B, column 6C conveys an impression of the orders of magnitude of the 
different effects. The strongest effects are for the PCT II indicator. PCT II applications in this 
sample are 87% more likely to be involved in an opposition than other patents. Also the 
accelerated examination request indicator is very strong. Patents which were examined in an 
accelerated procedure are 41% more likely to be attacked by opposing parties than other patents. 
It may be concluded that hypotheses H1 is preliminarily confirmed by the data. 
Having discussed the procedural indicators, the next three regressions are based on text 
indicators. The estimations use a probit model with correction for heteroscedasticity as proposed 
by Harvey (1976)12. I chose the heteroscedastic probit model for two reasons, a theoretical and a 
statistical one. Theoretically, the interviews with the patent attorneys pointed at the problems of 
differing individual modes of drafting patent applications leading to systematic noise in the data 
across various applicants. Statistically, models 7A through 7C support this assumption. 
 
Table 7 shows the results of three different regressions of the opposition variable on text 
indicators. 
 
Insert Table 7 about here 
 
Column 7A models the likelihood of an opposition using all text indicators computed in the 
study. The upper part of Table 7, column A, shows the first regression results of the most 
comprehensive specification in which all explanatory variables are used to model the likelihood 
                                                           
12 Appendix B shows the likelihood function. 
  26
of an opposition and the variance of the dependent variable at the same time. The lower part of 
Table 7, column A, shows the respective auxiliary regression. Here the coefficients describe the 
correlation between the explanatory variables and the variance in the main regression. Following 
an approach published by Lechner (1991) I carried out joint tests of significance for the 
individually insignificant coefficients in the auxiliary regression 7A to arrive at a robust 
specification for the auxiliary regression containing only few variables. The result is presented in 
the lower part of column 7B. The upper part of column 7C finally presents a specification 
modeling the likelihood of an opposition with correction for heteroscedasticity using only few 
variables. 
As can be seen from column 7C, four of the text indicators correlate significantly with the 
likelihood of an opposition when correcting for heteroscedasticity, namely the number of words 
describing the technical problem, the number of technical preferences, the number of independent 
product claims, and the number of dependent product claims. For a variety of reasons mentioned 
above, these results should be interpreted carefully. Still, the findings are very plausible given the 
state of knowledge developed in this paper. First of all, it was carefully predicted in Table 3 that 
the likelihood of an opposition should increase with the length of the problem description. 
Assuming the indicator operationalizes the degree of inventive activity, then the length of the 
problem description will correlate positively with the patent’s value. This has a positive effect on 
the likelihood of the opposition. On the other hand, the opponent’s expectations of winning the 
opposition case should fall with rising inventive activity. Thus, the result in 7C suggests the 
following: the positive effect on the likelihood of an opposition due to increased patent value 
exceeds the negative effect on the opposition likelihood due to the opponent’s diminished 
expectations of winning the case. Hence, the number of words describing the technical problem 
mainly correlates with the potential profits from protecting the invention.  
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Moving two coefficients down in column 7C, there is a positive correlation between the number 
of independent claims and the likelihood of an opposition. Again, the result seems plausible. 
Assuming that independent product claims operationalize the breadth of the patent as suggested 
in Table 3, then profits from the patent’s value should rise with the number of independent 
claims. If, as also suggested in Table 3, independent claims are also a measure of the inventive 
activity, then the opponent’s expectation of winning the opposition case should fall at the same 
time. Hence, the result found in 7C suggests that the same rationale applies to independent claims 
as to the number of words describing the technical problem. The positive effect on the likelihood 
of an opposition due to increased patent value exceeds the negative effect on the opposition 
likelihood due to the opponent’s diminished expectations of winning the case. Hence, the number 
of independent claims should correlate with the patent’s value.  
Theoretically, the last rationale could simply be applied to the dependent product claims, too. 
However, a more elaborated line of argument seems more convincing. As proposed in Table 3, 
dependent claims often serve as so-called ‘fall-back’ options. It seems plausible to assume that 
patentees are more likely to insert those costly fall-back options into a patent application when 
they face a higher chance of being attacked. Again, they do face a higher chance of being 
attacked the more valuable the patent and the higher the opponent’s anticipated probability of 
being successful in an opposition. Given the fact that the patent attorney faces additional costs for 
inserting each additional dependent claim, there is good reason to believe that also dependent 
claims are a valid correlate of a patent’s value. 
Finally, I would have expected the likelihood of an opposition to rise with the number of 
technical preferences. Table 3 suggests that technical preferences either serve as fall-back options 
or that that they reflect market proximity. However, in both cases the likelihood of an opposition 
should not drop. Hence, the results found in 7C conflict with the theoretical expectations and 
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additional explanations are needed. In fact, when looking again at the data in detail I find the 
highest number of technical preferences in those cases where the description of the technical 
invention is most comprehensive. This leads to the assumption that technical preferences possibly 
operationalize the disclosure of the patent rather than anything else. Assuming that technical 
preferences are an indicator for the disclosure of the patent, the results become then very 
plausible with respect to Article 83 EPC. According to this article, opponents may substantiate 
their opposition by blaming the patentee of insufficient disclosure. Then, the result in 7C suggests 
that the patentee invested additional time in the draft of the patent and in carrying out further 
experiments to reduce the likelihood of a substantiated opposition. His/her willingness to incur 
extra costs point at a high expected value of the patent. Apparently, however, the negative effect 
on the likelihood of an opposition mediated by decreased expectations of the opponent of 
winning in the opposition outweighs the positive value effect on the likelihood of the opposition. 
Overall, it can be concluded that the data provide some preliminary empirical evidence for the 
validity of hypotheses H2. 
Finally, Table 8 shows two further regressions. In column 8A the likelihood of an opposition is 
modeled using both procedural indicators and text indicators at the same time. Column 8B shows 
the corresponding marginal effects. 
 
Insert Table 8 about here 
 
Surprisingly, in this joint model of procedural and text indicators, only the number of application 
claims turns out to have a significant coefficient among all the text indicators. Again, the 
explanation of this result may only be preliminary and was not necessarily to be expected 
according to Table 3. It seems, however, as if patents protecting applications are less valuable 
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than patents that protect products which is consistent with the notions in the interviews. 
Comparing specifications 6 and 8, I find that the number of application claims adds to the 
explanatory power of the procedural indicators. This result gives some first empirical evidence 
for hypotheses H3. 
 
Conclusions and Outlook on Future Research 
 
Recalling the scope of the paper, I finally ask as to what extent the paper enhances our 
understanding of measuring patent value with indicators. This paper claims to contribute to a 
better understanding in three different ways. First, it expands the theory by analyzing patent 
attorneys’ work which appears crucial to interpret observable legal actions as indicators of patent 
value. In particular, new ideas for the compilation of various new indicators arise from the 
descriptions of patenting strategies. The paper suggests that operationalizations of key variables 
in the filing process, such as the state of the art of existing technology, the inventive activity, and 
the breadth of the patent should be suitable value indicators. Secondly, the paper confirms 
convincingly the validity of a new procedural indicator of patent value, the so-called accelerated 
examination request. The data provide empirical evidence that patents appear more valuable 
when patentees are willing to make a cost commitment early during the filing procedure. At the 
same time it reconfirms the validity of other procedural indicators of patent value, offering more 
detailed explanations for their validity than described in the literature so far. Third, the paper 
provides some preliminary results on the appropriateness of text indicators as additional measures 
of patent value. The results suggest that new indicators of patent value can be found by counting 
the number of words describing the technical problem, the number of technical preferences, 
independent and dependent product claims, and application claims. The results of this exploratory 
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study furthermore suggest that procedural indicators and text indicators add up in their 
explanatory power. From an applied standpoint, the two following remarks may of the highest 
interest: First, all of the tested indicators in this study are available early in the life-time of a 
patent, draw from publicly available information and are computable at low cost. Secondly, 
specification number 8 consisting of procedural and text indicators predicts the occurrence of an 
opposition correctly in 90% of all cases. Thus, in cases where the value of a patent portfolio 
roughly equals the sum of its individual patents the indicator approach works with considerable 
precision. This second finding has an important managerial implication. It suggests that indicator 
methods may become interesting patent valuation tools for analysts and R&D managers also at 
the corporate level. 
Despite the variety of results listed above, however, the paper only claims to provide 
preliminary empirical results that are worth of further investigation in the future. As laid out in 
detail in the discussion of the multivariate results, some limitations of the research design used in 
this study could be avoided in future work. Ambiguities in the interpretation of individual 
indicators will diminish if the actual patent value is used as the dependent variable. Corrections 
for heteroscedasticity should become obsolete if the sample consists of patents from only one 
company. As mentioned, however, surveys of the last sort are very costly and time consuming 
and require justification by preliminary results as shown in this study. 
Finally, I see an alternative chance to extend on this work in the future that does not 
require costly primary data as suggested in the previous paragraph. Structural models of patent 
litigation using information on opposition outcomes appear more appropriate to validate 
indicators of patent value unambiguously than the research design in this study. But, then again, 
we must learn to walk before we run. 
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Table 1 
Established Indicators of Patent Value 
Validity Variable 
Theoretical 
Foundation2) 
 
 
 
Empirical 
Evidence as of 
Today2) 
 
 
Availability in Time  
 
(Months after Filing Date) 
Compilation Costs 
 
(M): Manual 
Computation Necessary 
 
(E): Electronic 
Computation Possible 
Patent Age ++ - 48+ E 
Market Value of 
Corporation 
++ ++ - M, Partially E 
Backward Citations + +/- 18 E 
Forward Citations  ++ ++ Ca. 42+ E 
Family Size ++ + 18+ (preliminary)  3) 
ca. 42+ (finally) 
E 
‚Scope‘ + - 18+ (preliminary)  3) 
ca. 42+ (finally) 
E 
Ownership1) + ++ 18+ (preliminary)  3) 
ca. 42+ (finally) 
E 
Number of Claims ++ +/- 18+ (preliminary)  3) 
ca. 42+ (finally) 
E  
Patenting Strategy ++ +/- 18 respectively 19 + 
(preliminary) 3) 
ca. 42+ (finally) 
E 
Number of Applicants + +/- 18+ (preliminary)  3) 
ca. 42+ (finally) 
E 
Number of Trans- 
Boarder Research Co-
operations 
+ +/- 18+ (preliminary)  3) 
ca. 42+ (finally) 
E 
Key Inventors + + 18+ (preliminary)  3) 
ca. 42+ (finally) 
E 
Legal Disputes 
(Opposition i n Particular) 
++ +/- ca.42+  
(preliminary) 3) 
ca. 49+ (finally) 
M, Partially E 
 
Legend: 1):  Differently computed indicators in different studies 
                     2):  --: very weak;  -: weak; +/-: medium; +: strong; ++: very strong 
                     3) :  Information available after publication of application. Information can still change  
                    during the granting procedure 
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Table 2 
Indicators Computed From Procedural Information 
 
Variable Algorithm Expected 
Effect on 
Opposition 
Data Source 
Backward citations to 
patent literature 
Number of patent references to the state of the art that are actively quoted 
by the patent  
+ REFI ©1 
Backward citations to 
non-patent literature 
Number of non-patent references to the state of the art that are actively 
quoted by the patent 
No 
prediction5 
REFI ©1 
Family size Logarithm13 of the number of designated states  + ELPAC ©2 
‚Scope‘ Number of 4 digit IPC classes  + ELPAC ©2 
PCT I application Dummy variable taking on the value 1 if the patent was filed via PCT and 
the period of time between filing date and entry into the regional phase is 
20 months or less 
+ EPASYS ©3 
PCT II application Dummy variable taking on the value 1 if the patent was filed via PCT and 
the period of time between filing date and entry into the regional phase 
exceeds 20 months  
+ EPASYS ©3 
Share of A-
classifications among 
backward citations 
Share of backward citations among the total number of backward citations 
which were considered relevant but not innocuous by the preliminary 
examiners in the Hague 
- REFI ©1.4 
Share of X-
classifications among 
backward citations 
Share of backward citations among the total number of backward citations 
which were considered potentially innocuous by the preliminary 
examiners in the Hague 
+ REFI ©1.4 
Number of inventors Total number of inventors (+)6 ELPAC ©2 
Number of applicants Dummy variable taking on the value 1 if more than one applicant is 
mentioned in the patent 
(-) ELPAC ©2 
Accelerated search 
request 
Dummy variable taking on the value 1 if a request was filed for an 
accelerated production of the search report  
(+) EPASYS ©3 
Accelerated 
examination request 
Dummy variable taking on the value 1 if a request was filed for an 
accelerated examination 
+ EPASYS ©3 
 
Legend: 1): REFI: Commercially available citation data bank provided by the EPO Vienna 
2): ELPAC: Commercially available EP patent data bank provided by the EPO Vienna.  
3): EPASYS: Procedural databank of the EPO. Not commercially available. 
4): There are hints that REFI might be incomplete with respect to the citation classifications; at first 
sight it seems as if data provided by the www-server http://www.epoline.org. was more 
comprehensive. The last server draws from a databank called INPADOC. The reasons for the 
inconsistencies are unknown for the time being. 
5): The effect can theoretically point in both directions. 
6): Effects in brackets are subject to greater uncertainty. 
                                                           
13 The operationalization builds on Harhoff and Reitzig (2000). 
Table 3 
Indicators Computed From Full-Text Information 
 
Variable Link / Operationalization Expected 
Effect on 
Patent Value   
Expected 
Effect on 
Opponent’s 
Anticipated 
Probability 
of Winning 
Expected 
Observable 
Effect on 
Likelihood of 
Opposition 
· State of the art / Novelty + Unknown 2) Number of words describing the 
state of the art 
· (Disclosure) + - 
(+)3) 
 
Number of words describing the 
technical problem 
· Degree of inventive activity: Problem of the protected invention as ‘counterpart’ 
to the technical solution and therefore to the degree of inventive activity 
+ - (+) 
· Expected demand: Technical advantages as a sign of product- and market 
proximity of the invention 
+ Unknown Number of mentioned technical 
advantages of the invention 
· Technical advantages as hidden fall-back options  Unknown + 
(+) 
 
· Expected demand: Technical preferences as a sign of product and market 
proximity of the invention 
+ Unknown Number of technical preferences 
of the invention 
· Technical preferences as hidden fall-back options  Unknown + 
(+) 
 
· Degree of inventive activity: Independent claims as concise description of the 
solution and therefore of the degree of inventive activity 
+ - 
· Breadth + Unknown 
Number of independent claims 
· Expected demand: Product and market proximity + Unknown 
(+) 
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Continuation of Table 3: 
 
 
Variable Link / Operationalization Expected 
Effect on 
Patent Value   
Expected 
Effect on 
Opponent’s 
Anticipated 
Probability 
of Winning 
Expected 
Observable 
Effect on 
Likelihood of 
Opposition 
· See above (independent claims)  + (-) Number of dependent claims 
· Fall-back options Unknown + 
(+) 
 
· See above (independent claims)  + (-) Number of process claims 1 
· Fall-back options Unknown + 
(+) 
 
· See above (independent claims)  + (-) Number of application claims1 
· Fall-back options Unknown + 
(+) 
 
Legend: 1): Process and application claims may also be independent claims. To ensure a better distinction between independent product claims and  
process- and application claims, however, I decided to count them separately in this study. 
2): In these cases the existing theory does not allow to predict an effect . 
3): Effects in brackets are subject to greater uncertainty. 
Table 4 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable 
 
Mean S.D. Min. Max. 
Opposition (0: no; 1: yes)  0.13  0 1 
Family size (Log. of number of designated states)  2.12 0.45 0 2,83 
Number of inventors 3.35 1.66 1 8 
Number of applicants > 1    (0: 0; 1.>=1) 0.02  0 1 
„Scope“ 2.24 1.87 1 13 
PCT II application (0: no; 1: yes) 0.03  0 1 
PCT I application (0: no; 1: yes) 0.01  0 1 
Accelerated examination request (0: no; 1: yes) 0.02  0 1 
Accelerated search request (0: no; 1: yes) 0.01  0 1 
Backward citations to patent literature 3.05 2.03 0 13 
Backward citations to non-patent literature 0.81 1.28 0 12 
Share of Citations classified as „A“ among the 
total number of backward citations 
0.42 0.38 0 1 
Share of Citations classified as „X“ among the 
total number of backward citations 
0.10 0.24 0 1 
Number of words describing the state of the art 326.07 257.19 01) 2115 
Number of words describing the technical 
problem 
36.20 29.99 02) 295 
Number of technical advantages 4.41 5.69 0 49 
Number of technical preferences 35.74 37.72 0 304 
Number of independent claims 0.643) 0.58 0 7 
Number of dependent claims 2.51 3.25 0 21 
Number of process claims  4.28 4.15 0 26 
Number of application claims 0.77 1.50 0 11 
 
 Legend:  N=813 
1): In these cases it was impossible to unambiguously identify a passage in the text that was 
solely referring to the state of the art (see text). 
 
2): In these cases it was impossible to unambiguously identify a passage in the text that was 
solely referring to the technical problem (see text). 
 
3): As independent process- and application claims were counted separately from 
independent product claims, the mean of ‘independent’ (product) claims may well be 
below unity. 
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Table 5 
Bivariate Correlations Between Explanatory Variables and Occurrence of Opposition 
 
Variable 
 
No 
Opposition 
Opposition t-Test14 
(P-Value) 
Family size (Log. of number of designated states) 2.08 2.17 -1.60* 
(0.10) 
Number of inventors 3.44 3.06 1.97** 
(0.05) 
Inventors > 1    (0:0; 1:>=1) 0.01 0.02 -1.23 
(0.22) 
‚Scope‘ 2.29 2.11 0.86 
(0.39) 
PCT II application (0: no; 1: yes)  0.00 0.20 -12.47*** 
(< 0.001) 
PCT I application (0: no; 1: yes) 0.01 0.01 0.02 
(0.98) 
Accelerated examination request (0: no; 1: yes) 0.01 0.10 -5.91*** 
(< 0.001) 
Accelerated search request (0: no; 1: yes) 0.01 0.02 -1.45 
(0.15) 
Backward citations to patent literature 3.07 3.10 -0.14 
(0.89) 
Backward citations to non-patent literature 0.79 0.60 1.34 
(0.18) 
Share of Citations classified as „A“ among the 
total number of backward citations 
0.44 0.35 2.02** 
(0.04) 
Share of Citations classified as „X“ among the 
total number of backward citations 
0.09 0.11 -0.44 
(0.65) 
Number of words describing the state of the art 318.60 336.77 -0.62 
(0.53) 
Number of words describing the technical 
problem 
35.33 40.79 -1.56 
(0.12) 
Number of technical advantages 4.41 4.91 -0.74 
(0.46) 
Number of technical preferences 38.10 36.69 0.38 
(0.76) 
Number of independent claims 0.62 0.54 1.10 
(0.27) 
Number of dependent claims 2.40 2.71 -0.83 
(0.41) 
Number of process claims 4.23 4.10 0.27 
(0.78) 
Number of application claims 0.75 0.66 0.54 
(0.58) 
 
Legend:  *:  Significant at 10% level (two -tailed test) 
     **:  Significant at 5% level (two-tailed test) 
  ***:  Significant at 1% level (two-tailed test) 
                                                           
14 Asymptotic t-tests for dummy variables. 
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Table 6 
Likelihood of Opposition Modeled by Procedural Indicators (Simple Probit) 
 
Independent Variable Column A 
Probit Coefficient  
(S.D.) 
Column B 
Probit Coefficient 
(S.D.) 
Column C 
Coefficient of Marginal 
Effect in Regression B 
(S.D.) 
Family size   0.31**   (0.13)  0.32*** (0.13)  0.06*** (0.02) 
Number of inventors (Coefficient x 10) -0.53       (0.41) - - 
Inventors > 1  0.20       (0.42) - - 
‚Scope‘ (Coefficient x 10) -0.03       (0.36) - - 
PCT II application(0: no; 1: yes)  2.93*** (0.52)  3.09*** (0.51)  0.87*** (0.05) 
PCT I application (0: no; 1: yes)  0.08       (0.55) - - 
Accelerated examination request(0: no; 1: yes)  1.37*** (0.48)  1.29*** (0.41)  0.41*** (0.16) 
Accelerated search request (0: no; 1: yes) -0.26       (0.54) - - 
Backward citations to patent literature 
(Coefficient x 10)  
 0.62*     (0.33)  0.71**   (0.31)  0.13**   (0.05) 
Backward citations to non-patent literature -0.08       (0.06) - - 
Share of Citations classified as „A“ among the total 
number of backward citations  
-0.20       (0.19) - - 
Share of Citations classified as „X“ among the total 
number of backward citations  
 0.05       (0.27) - - 
Dummy for organic fine chemistry -0.98**   (0.45) -0.55*** (0.15) -0.09*** (0.02) 
Dummy for polymer chemistry -0.58       (0.44) - - 
Dummy for biotechnology - 0.36      (0.50) - - 
Dummy for pharmaceutical chemistry -0.46       (0.54) - - 
Dummy for petrol industry 
Basic chemicals 
-0.33       (0.45) - - 
Constant -1.25**   (0.53) -2.07*** (0.28) - 
Wald c2 
(A:17 / B:5 / C:5)  
83.60 (P<0.001) 71.93 (P<0.001) 71.93 (P<0.001) 
Pseudo R² 0.22 0.21 0.21 
N 813 813 813 
 
Legend:  *:  Significant at 10% level (two -tailed test) 
     **:  Significant at 5% level (two-tailed test) 
  ***:  Significant at 1% level (two-tailed test) 
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Table 7 
Likelihood of Opposition Modeled by Text Indicators (Het-Probit) 
 
Independent Variable Column A 
Coefficient in the Main 
Regression 
(S.D.) 
Column B 
Coefficient in the Main 
Regression 
(S.D.) 
Column C 
Coefficient in the Main 
Regression 
(S.D.) 
Number of words describing the state of the art 
(Coefficient x 1000) 
-0.21       (0.16) -0.22*    (0.12) -0.26       (0.20) 
Number of words describing the technical problem 
(Coefficient x 100) 
-0.08       (0.22)  0.29       (0.19)  0.38*     (0 .21) 
Number of technical advantages (Coefficient x 10)  0.08       (0.11)  0.10       (0.07) - 
Number of technical preferences  
(Coefficient x 100) 
-0.43       (0.37) -0.88*     (0.54) -1.63**   (0.72) 
Number of independent claims  0.16*** (0.05)  0.13*** (0.04)  0.14*** (0.04) 
Number of dependent claims (Coefficient x 10)   0.61*** (0.17)  0.53*** (0.10)  0.64*** (0.13) 
Number of process claims (Coefficient x 100) -4.10*     (2.18) -2.86**   (1.34) - 
Number of application claims (Coefficient x 10)  0.83*** (0.27) -0.11       (0.32) - 
Dummy for organic fine chemistry -1.22*** (0.34) -0.96*** (0.27) -0.81*** (0.18) 
Dummy for polymer chemistry -0.42*     (0.25) -0.27       (0.22) - 
Dummy for biotechnology -0.03       (0.27)  0.09       (0.23)  0.31*     (0.17) 
Dummy for pharmaceutical chemistry -0.39       (0.33) -0.31       (0.29)  
Dummy for petrol industry 
Basic chemicals 
-0.21       (0.24) -0.06       (0.21) - 
Constant -0.57**   (0.27) -0.61*** (0.22) -0.91*** (0.14) 
Wald c2 (A:13 / B:13 / C:7) 43.52 (P<0.001) 104.30 (P<0.001) 73.94 (P<0.001) 
N 813 813 813 
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Continuation of Table 7: 
 
Auxiliary Regression (ln s² Dependent Variable) Coefficient 
(S.D.) 
Coefficient 
(S.D.) 
Coefficient 
(S.D.) 
Number of words describing the state of the art 
(Coefficient x 1000) 
 0.08       (0.26) - - 
Number of words describing the technical problem 
(Coefficient x 100) 
 0.28       (0.31) - - 
Number of technical advantages (Coefficient x 10) -0.02       (0.15) - - 
Number of technical preferences (Coefficient x 100)  0.47*     (0.29)  0.81*** (0.30)  1.03*** (0.31) 
Number of independent claims  -0.27**   (0.14) -0.31*** (0.11) -0.32*** (0.10) 
Number of dependent claims -0.10*** (0.03) -0.10*** (0.04) -0.05**   (0.02) 
Number of process claims (Coefficient x 10)  0.28       (0.24) - - 
Number of application claims (Coefficient x 10) -1.64**   (0.84) - - 
Log Likelihood Ratio Test For s²: c2 (A:8 / B:3 / 
C:3) 
25.74 (P<0.001) 21.58 (P<0.001) 21.21 (P<0.001) 
 
Legend:  *:  Significant at 10% level (two-tailed test) 
     **:  Significant at 5% level (two-tailed test) 
  ***:  Significant at 1% level (two-tailed test) 
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Table 8 
Likelihood of Opposition Modeled by Procedural and Text Indicators (Simple Probit) 
 
Independent Variable Column A 
Probit 
Coefficient 
(S.D.) 
Column C 
Marginal Effect 
(S.D.)  
Family size  0.37*** (0.13)  0.07*** (0.02) 
PCT II application  
(no: 0; yes: 1) 
 3.21*** (0.57)  0.88*** (0.04) 
Accelerated examination 
request (no: 0; yes: 1) 
 1.23*** (0.41)  0.38*** (0.16) 
Backward citations to 
patent literature  
(Coefficient x 10) 
 0.73**   (0.31)  0.13**   (0.05) 
Number of application 
claims 
-0.09*     (0.05) -0.02*     (0.01) 
Dummy for organic fine 
chemistry 
-0.59*** (0.15) -0.10*** (0.02) 
Constant  -2.11*** (0.28) - 
Likelihood c2 
(A:6 / B:6) 
67.66 (P<0.001) 67.66 (P<0.001) 
Pseudo R2 0.21 0.21 
N 813 813 
 
Legend:  *:  Significant at 10% level (two -tailed test) 
     **:  Significant at 5% level (two-tailed test) 
  ***:  Significant at 1% level (two-tailed test) 
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Appendix A: Industry Branches 
 
Industry Branch (4 digit) IPC Subclass 
Organic fine chemistry C07C,-D, -F, -H, -J, –K 
Macromolecular chemistry / Polymers C08B, -F, -G, -H, -K, –L 
C09D, –J 
C13L 
Pharmaceuticals / Cosmetics A61K 
Biotechnology C07G 
C12M, -N, -P, -Q, -R, –S 
Agricultural chemistry / Food chemistry A01H 
A21D 
A23B, -C, -D, -F, -G, -J, -K, –L 
C12C, -F, -G, -H, –J 
C13D, -F, -J, –K 
Petrol industry / Basic chemicals C09B, -C, -F, -G, -H, –K 
C10B, -C, -F, -G, -H, -J, -K, -L, –M 
C11B, -C, –D 
Source: Schmoch and Kirsch (1994) 
 
  44
Appendix B: The Likelihood Function of the Het-Probit 
 
The following equation shows the likelihood function of a probit that corrects for 
heteroscedasticity.  
 
 ( )
1
' '
ln ln 1 ln 1
n
i i
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i i i
x x
L y y
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Here yi is the observable dependent variable of the main regression and xi represent the 
exogenous variables of the main regression. si is the standard deviation in the main regression. 
To correct for heteroscedasticity, the standard deviation (or variance) of the main regression is 
simultaneously estimated in an auxiliary regression of the following type: 
 
 ( )exp 'i izs g=   
 
Here zi represent the explaining variables of the standard deviation.  
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Figure 1: Latent Constructs of Patent Value 
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Legend:  Not all interdependencies are illustrated. The arrows read as follows (examples given below): 
- Backward citations are an indicator of the profits from a patent as measured with ex-post  
expertise. 
- The number of forward citations is affected by the value of the patent. 
- The anticipated value of the patent rises with the family size and vice versa 
- Grey background: Variable or indicator (partly) endogenous for the patentee 
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Figure 2: The Life Tree of an EP-Patent 
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Legend: 1A: Patentee’s/attorney’s decision whether an application is filed or not 
  2B: Decision by EPO whether to file an examiner’s report or not 
  3A: Patentee’s/attorney’s response to the examiner’s report 
  4A: Decision by third parties whether to file an opposition or not 
  5A: Decision by the EPO on the outcome of the opposition plea 
  6A: Decision by patentee/opponent on appeal
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Figure 3: Patent Filing Strategies 
Legend: “GebrM”: Official Abbreviation for a German Utility Patent  
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